比较优势与制度安排  

Comparative Advantage and Institutional Arrangement

作　　者：侯经川[1] 黄祖辉[1] 钱文荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学中国农村发展研究院,杭州310029

出　　处：《公共管理学报》2006年第4期31-39,共9页Journal of Public Management

基　　金：湖南省社会科学基金资助项目(05ZC28)

摘　　要：以“比较优势”“、有限(价值)理性”和“制度二要素”这三个基本假设为基础,以李嘉图所举的“英国和葡萄牙”为实例,对比较优势条件与制度安排的关系作了一个比较系统的探讨,结果发现:无论是从规则安排方面来说,还是从组织安排方面来说,比较优势条件都对制度安排具有决定性的影响。就规则安排而言,在比较优势太小和分工利益太少的情况下,保障分工的规则安排往往不存在;只有当比较优势足够大和分工利益足够多时,保障分工的规则安排才能出现;但当比较优势扩大到超过“自然分工条件”的时候,这种规则安排又会失去存在的必要。就组织安排而言,当规则供给的绝对成本一定时,绝对劣势方总是比绝对优势方作为规则供给者(组织)的相对效率要高。Based on three assumptions of 'Comparative Advantage', 'Limited (Value) Rationality', and 'Dualistic Structure of Institution (rule + organization)', citing the famous instance of 'England & Portugal' given by David Ricardo, this paper performs a systematic exploration on the effect of comparative advantage conditions on institutional arrangement. It is found that the comparative advantage conditions of the two sides play a crucial role on their institutional choice, both on their choice for rule arrangement and on their choice for organization arrangement. In respect of rule arrangement, the fit rules ensuring the specialization of the two sides will not exist until the comparative advantage between them become large enough to bring both of them acceptable division gain, and will lose the necessity of existence when it enlarges to exceed the 'Natural Division Point'. As for organization arrangement, the absolute disadvantage side is more efficient than the absolute advantage one as the organizer supplying the rules, given that the absolute cost of rule supply is constant.

关 键 词：比较优势 制度安排 规则安排 组织安排 

分 类 号：F01[经济管理—政治经济学]