从马克思早年的法哲学观重新解读“苦恼的疑问”  

Reinterpreting the Afflictive Question in the View of the Philosophy of Rights of Early Marx

作　　者：刘日明[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学哲学系,上海200433

出　　处：《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2006年第6期21-25,共5页Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University

基　　金：国家社科基金项目<马克思法哲学理论的当代意义研究>(06CZX001)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：马克思早年的“新理性批判主义”法哲学观决定了自己既不能像鲍威尔等青年黑格尔派那样完全置“物质利益”于不顾,又不能像黑格尔那样以“理念的自身同一”的方式来解决“物质利益”问题,因而产生了“苦恼的疑问”。“苦恼的疑问”本质上是“物质利益”问题向马克思早年的仍具浓厚形而上学色彩的法哲学观的挑战。In his early years, Marx neither neglected the material benefit such as the School of Young Hegel nor settled it in this way of the Identity of Absolute Mind of Hegel due to his Neorational-criticism. Thus, the Afflictive Question appeared. Essentially, it was a challenge of problem of material benefit to the metaphysics of rights of early Marx.

关 键 词：新理性批判主义 物质利益 苦恼的疑问 

分 类 号：A811[哲学宗教—马克思主义哲学]