论最高法院在宏观调控中的角色定位  

Analyzing the Supreme Court's Role in Macro Regulation

作　　者：鲁篱[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学法学院,四川成都610074

出　　处：《现代法学》2006年第6期107-113,共7页Modern Law Science

基　　金：教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目(教技函〔2006〕6号)

摘　　要：最高法院对宏观调控的介入具有一定的可能性,但必须充分认识到其介入宏观调控所面临的制度障碍、知识障碍、工具障碍、观念障碍以及成本障碍。最高法院对宏观调控的介入只能是一种被动的消极角色,而且尚必须注重与其他社会系统充分的信息交流和对话,强调司法权的自我约束。To some extent, it is justifiable for the Supreme Court to intervene in macro regulation. However, The Supreme Court should adequately recognize the barriers against macro regulation in the system, knowledge, instrument, idea and cost. Therefore, the Supreme Court cannot but play a passive and negative role in intervening macro regulation. And it must seriously take into account sufficient communication of information and dialog with other social systems and highlight self-regulation of jurisdiction.

关 键 词：最高法院 司法权 宏观调控权 

分 类 号：D971.262[政治法律—法学]