资金约束条件下的垄断企业策略性退出模型研究  

A Model for Strategic Withdraw under Capital Constraints

作　　者：叶泽[1] 喻苗[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2006年第6期714-718,共5页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473008);湖南省教育厅重点科研项目(04A003)

摘　　要：传统的垄断企业退出模型没有考虑资金约束问题,通过研究双寡头企业在资金约束条件下如何从需求不断萎缩的产业退出的问题:首先描述了双寡头垄断企业策略性退出的基本模型,然后引入资金约束变量,分析企业资金实力如何影响和决定退出时机和顺序。结果表明,虽然不具备策略优势并且也将在消耗战中遭受损失,但雄厚的资金实力能保证企业在退出博弈中胜出,并且获得最后的垄断利润。因此,拥有雄厚资金实力的垄断企业的最优策略通常是继续保留在市场中,而不是传统模型中所指出的由于不具有策略优势而最先退出。Capital constraints were not considered in the classical modes. How duopoly firms with capital constraints withdraw from an industry whose demands are declining was studied. Basic mode is proposed for du-oligarch firms＇ strategic withdrawing. Introducing capital constraints, the analysis was done of how the firms＇ capital strengths influence the opportunities and orders of their withdraws. The model shows the firm with ＂long purse＂ may find it optimal to stay in the market despite making temporary losses to outlast its rival in the war of attrition. The optimal strategy for that monopoly firms customarily is to persist in the market, differing from the traditional models in which the firms lacking the strategic advantages would withdraw.

关 键 词：资金约束 策略性退出 消耗战 GN模型 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]