新制度经济学的新发展:历史比较制度分析  

Recent developments of new institutional economics:institutional analysis of historical comparison

作　　者：卓越[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《经济学家》2006年第6期19-27,共9页Economist

基　　金：湖南省社科规划项目"我国家族企业转型与社会信任重建研究"(04YB051)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：新制度经济学在完全理性与有限理性之间左右摇摆,限制了制度理论的发展。以格雷夫为代表的历史比较制度分析,在有限理性前提下,通过大量案例研究,提出了自己关于制度及其变迁的真知灼见:(1)克服两个“两分法”,发展了统一的制度概念;(2)将制度理解为博弈均衡,重点解释古典博弈论成为制度分析有用工具的条件;(2)研究制度在变化的环境中如何存续、内生的制度变迁以及过去制度影响后续制度的原因和作用机制;(3)提出了独具特色的互动的特定历史情景分析,将重复博弈理论与特定历史情景结合起来去识别制度,解释其出现、存续和变迁。New institutional economics sways between complete rationality and limited rationality, which limits the development of institutional theories. Upon the prerequisite of limited rationality and through large amount of case studies, Grave, as the representative of institutional analysis of historical comparison, puts forward his views on institution and its changes： （ 1 ） abolish two dichotomy methods, and develop unitary concept of institution; （2） comprehend institution as gaming equilibrium, focusing on the conditions under which the classical gaming theories become a useful tool for institutional analysis; （3） research on how institution continues to exist in a changing environment, endogenous institutional changes, and how and why the past instituticas influence the successive institutions; （4） conduct unique interactive specific historical scenario analysis, combing repeated gaming theory with specific historical scenario in order to define institution as well as explain its rise, continuity and changes.

关 键 词：格雷夫 历史比较制度分析 特定历史情景分析 内生制度变迁 

分 类 号：F091.349[经济管理—政治经济学]