An Empirical Analysis on the Dissimilation of Independent Audit Relationship  

作　　者：Guanting Chen Lirong Ma 

机构地区：[1]Tsinghua University [2]North China Electric Power University

出　　处：《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》2006年第2期67-80,共14页现代会计与审计（英文版）

摘　　要：Under the situation where the ownership is split up, existing shareholders might occupy potential shareholders＇ interests, and similarly, controlling shareholders might occupy the interests of minority shareholders. This is called interests entrenchment effect, which leads to the dissimilation of independent audit relationship. That is to say, existing shareholders and controlling shareholders have the probabilities to utilize auditing commission to manipulate audit opinions with the purpose of interests entrenchment, which forces auditors who should be independent ＂third party＂ to become audit clients or accessories of ＂interests coupling between audit clients and auditees＂. According to the argument above, this paper proposes the owners＇ interests entrenchment hypotheses. It also proves that existing shareholders occupy potential shareholders＇ interests, and controlling shareholders occupy minority shareholders＇ interests on the basis of the data of A-share companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchanges.

关 键 词：independent audit relationship DISSIMILATION interests entrenchment effect 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]