Real Option and Strategic Decision Making of Duopoly  

作　　者：Wuxiang Wang Runqing Zhang Bing Liu 

机构地区：[1]Tianjin University [2]Agriculture University of Hebei [3]Town and Country Architecture College of Baoding

出　　处：《Chinese Business Review》2005年第9期55-58,共4页中国经济评论（英文版）

摘　　要：Other than traditional valuation methods, the real option approach captures the flexibility inherent in investment decisions to make the optimal decision of a finn in isolation from its competitors. In reality, however, the actions or decisions of competing fn-ms （practical or potential） often affect each other＇s investment opportunity. The value of the project for the firms is assumed to follow a Geometric Brownian motion, and the model combines game theory and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty. This paper characterizes the resulting Nash equilibrium under different assumptions on the information that the firms have each other＇s valuation for the project.

关 键 词：Investment Under Uncertainty irreversible investment Real Options 

分 类 号：F0[经济管理—政治经济学]