Prevention of the Member＇s Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Alliance  

作　　者：Chenglin Liao Kaiqian Wu Xianmu Qiao 

机构地区：[1]College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400044 [2]Chongqing Resident Office, National Audit Office of China, 2 Nanping East Road, Chongqing 400060 [3]Master of Management, College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400044

出　　处：《Chinese Business Review》2003年第5期50-53,共4页中国经济评论（英文版）

摘　　要：Moral hazard is an important factor threatening stability of dynamic alliance. Firstly, the paper describes the problem of moral hazard in dynamic alliance and introduces the Tirole Model of moral hazard prevention. Then, by introducing a third-party system into dynamic alliance, a model of incomplete information dynamic game theory is formulated in the principal-agent framework. The model shows the dynamic consistency between a member＇s income and the dynamic alliance＇s profit, and that moral hazard can be prevented by an allocation policy With both characteristics of incentive measures and supervision, which is designed by a third-party system. Finally, the composition of the third-party system is discussed.

关 键 词：Dynamic alliance Moral hazard Principal-agent Third-party system 

分 类 号：F0[经济管理—政治经济学]