医疗保障的核心命题——医生行为的正向干预  

The Key Issue of Medical Guarantee——Positive Intervention of Doctors' Behaviors

作　　者：周良荣[1] 贺敬波[2] 

机构地区：[1]南华大学,湖南衡阳421001 [2]深圳市宝安区人民医院,广东深圳518101

出　　处：《中国医院管理》2006年第12期49-50,共2页Chinese Hospital Management

摘　　要：医生行为是医疗费用的阀门,也是医疗费用过快增长的直接责任者,直接关乎医疗保健产业乃至整个经济社会的可持续发展。在市场经济社会,医生行为与居民医疗保障水平和医疗保险制度效果存在原发性矛盾。在居民主要自费医疗的情况下,依靠医生的自律以及与患者的博弈无法解决这一矛盾,关键的路径是政府通过体制的、制度的、行政的等方式对医生行为进行正向干预。Doctors＇ behavior, the origin of medical： expenses and also the direct cause of the rising medical cost, it directly related to the sustainable development of medical health care and even the whole economic society.In the market economy society, long,standing conflicts exist between doctors＇ behaviors and the level of residents＇ medical guarantee and efficiency, of medical insurance system.Nowadays, residents have to consult doctors at their own expense, so it is impossible to solve the contradiction by means of doctors＇ self-discipline and antagonism with patients. The key lies in the government＇s positive intervention in systematic, administrative and executive way.

关 键 词：医生行为 干预 医疗保障 

分 类 号：R197.3[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]