扶持我国出口导向企业实施RRC战略的理论依据  

The Efficiency of Subsidizing Domestic Export-oriented Oligopoly's RRC Strategy

作　　者：罗云辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2006年第12期41-52,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70603007)"985"<中国经济国际竞争力研究>课题阶段性成果

摘　　要：文章探讨本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业实施提高竞争对手成本(RRC)战略的投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业RRC投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业RRC投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。由于RRC战略较之掠夺性定价温和且更易实施,这一政策对于保持我国出口稳定增长具有一定积极意义。The paper provides an explanation for subsidizing raising rival＇s costs （RRC） investment of domestic export-oriented oligopoly. Using backward induction solution and two-stage game twice, we induce the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a three-stage game composed of domestic subsidy policy,firms＇ RRC investment and output or profit decision. The conclusion includes that the subsidy policy is in favor of the outputs,market share and profits of the domestic duopoly, it also benefits domestic social welfare and has negative effect on foreign duopoly＇s or social＇s similar indexes accordingly. Since RRC strategy is moderate and easier to implement comparing to predatory pricing,the subsidy policy could be meaningful to holding China＇s export increasing smoothly.

关 键 词：RRC战略投资补贴 出口 产量竞争 

分 类 号：F130[经济管理—世界经济]