不完全信息条件下合作伙伴分拆机制  

Dissolving a Partnership with Simple Mechanisms under Incomplete Information

作　　者：王平平[1] 孙绍荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院

出　　处：《系统工程》2006年第10期63-66,共4页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70241005);上海市重点学科项目(T0502)

摘　　要：在不完全信息和共同价值以及所有权人是风险中性的情况下,考察合作伙伴的资产分割的简单机制,其中所有权人占有不同份额,机制设计者没有关于所有权人估价信号分布的信息。本文主要研究分配机制能否导致分配的公平性,证明分割与选择机制总是偏袒选择者且有失公平性。研究结果为我国股票市场的股权分置改革提供了有益的借鉴。In incomplete information setting with risk-neutral claimants, when claimants＇ valuations are common, we study mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership where the claimants have inequality share of the asset and the mechanism designer has no information about the distribution of signals of the claimants. We show that the divide and choose mechanism always favors the chooser and hence fails in view of fairness. We then explore the fairness properties of the first-price and the second-price auctions and suggest that they favor winning （respectively,losing） bidder in ex post allocation of revenue. The results obtained can provide useful references for reforming the splitting of shareholding in China＇s stock market.

关 键 词：合伙分拆 公平分配 机制设计 分割与选择机制 股权分置 

分 类 号：F810[经济管理—财政学]