国际机制的创设与国家利益的博弈——一种国际政治经济学的视角  

International Regimes Establishment and National Interest Gambling——An International Political Economy Angle of View

作　　者：欧阳永[1] OU Yang-yong （Institute of Political Science and Law, Central China Normal university, Wuhan 430079, China）

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学政法学院,湖北武汉430079

出　　处：《平原大学学报》2006年第6期10-13,共4页Journal of Pingyuan University

摘　　要：追求国家利益是国家对外行为的根本动因，国际机制的创设与国家利益之间是一个极为复杂的动态博弈。不论是霸权国家还是非霸权国家，作为理性的经济人，都在不同程度上存在机会主义倾向，导致了国际合作的不确定性。根据博弈论等经济学理论，霸权国家主导创设国际机制有其内在动机。国家机会主义行为的产生也有其内在根源，因此在国际机制创设过程中如何减少机会主义的发生，雏持稳定的国际合作显得尤为重要。Pursuit of national interests is the fundamental dynamics of the country＇s foreign acts, there is an extremely complex dynamic gambling between the international regimes establishment and the national interests. Whether hegemonic country or non-hegemonic country as a rational economic person, the existence of opportunistic tendencies is in varying degrees, leading to international cooperation uncertainty. According to economic theory and the game theory, the hegemonic country leads to establish the international regimes because of intrinsic motive of its own. The national opportunist behavior production also has its intrinsic root, so how to reduce the opportunistic occurrence in the international regimes establishments process, and maintain the stable international cooperation is particularly important.

关 键 词：国际机制 国家利益 寻租行为 纳什均衡 无差异曲线 

分 类 号：D813.4[政治法律—国际关系;政治法律—政治学;政治法律—外交学]