收购人层级与收购后上市公司长期绩效  

Corporate Layer and the Long-term Performance of Listed Firms after Control Transfer

作　　者：邓淑芳[1] 姚正春[1] 李志文[2] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院 [2]浙江大学

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2006年第6期55-60,103,共7页Nankai Business Review

摘　　要：本文以控制权转移市场为背景,集中关注了收购人复杂控制结构的成因,以及收购人结构与被收购上市公司长期股价表现之间的联系。我们使用“层级”度量收购人结构的复杂程度,研究结果表明,收购人控制结构的复杂程度与收购后上市公司绩效之间存在显著的倒U型关系。当收购人控制结构很复杂或很简单时,被收购上市公司的长期股价表现相对较差,其中,那些被具有复杂控制结构的收购人收购的上市公司,长期股价表现最差。Based on data from the corporate control transfer market in China, the authors focus on the complex control chain of the bidders and factors that leads to them. By using ＇Corporate Layer＇ to measure the complexity of control chain, the authors find that there exists significant reverse U shape relationship between the bidders＇ layer and the long-term performance of target listed firms. For the bidder with more corporate layers and those with fewer corporate layers, the long-term performance of listed firms after control transfer is significantly lower. Furthermore, target firms held by bidders with more corporate layers have the worst long-term performance. The result indicates that corporate layer has information meaning： complex organization structure itself may imply ill incentive.

关 键 词：层级 控制权转让 绩效 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F224