R & D STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN AN ASYMMETRICAL CASE  

作　　者：Minggao XUE Pu GONG 

机构地区：[1]Department of Finance, College of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China.

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》2006年第4期547-557,共11页系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）

基　　金：This work is supported by Post Doctor Science Foundation of China(2003034479);Natural Science Foundation of China(70671047)

摘　　要：This article analyzes R ＆ D investment decisions in an asymmetrical case. The investment decisions share three important characteristics. First, the investment is completely irreversible. Second, there are two kinds of uncertainties over the future returns from the investment and over technology in R ＆ D process, respectively. Third, there is strategic competition in the asymmetrical case. This article presents the optimal investment threshold values and the optimal investment rule of high-efficient firm （leader）, and shows that the investment threshold values are reduced by competition of two firms. Finally, the mixed investment strategies for two firms, the probability that each firm separately exercises the option to invest, and the probability that two firms simultaneously exercise the option are given in the paper.

关 键 词：Asymmetric information optimal investment threshold value option game preemption the mixed investment strategy. 

分 类 号：N94[自然科学总论—系统科学]