基于信息经济学的担保机构与中小企业信贷分析  

Analysis of Guarantee Organizations and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Credit Loan Based Information Economics

作　　者：位志宇[1] 杨忠直[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《管理科学》2006年第6期64-68,共5页Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：引入担保机构变量,建立担保银行信贷配给模型,分析担保机构、银行与中小企业之间的作用机理以及担保机构在信息不对称情况下面临着企业逆向选择及道德风险时的风险规避选择。研究结果表明,引入担保机构加大了对企业的资格审核,但是银行面临的风险却转嫁给了担保机构;从理论上说明贷款企业是在一定条件下才采用混同均衡;担保机构只要设立合适的契约组合,可以使企业自我显示风险类型,规避风险。尽管引入担保机构缓和了银行的信用配给,但由于担保壁垒的存在,解决中小企业贷款的能力十分有限。建议推动银保合作及推行社会化的担保机构,共同分担风险,从根本上解决中小企业的融资困境。This paper establishes a guarantee-batik-credit rationing model with the introduction of guarantee organizations. It analyses the interactive mechanisms among guarantee organizations, banks and small and medium-sized enterprises, and that guarantee organizations make some decisions when moral hazard and adverse selection exist in the cases of information asymmetry. The result indicates that with the introduction of guarantee organization, the qualification auditing of enterprises is enhanced, however, the risks that the banks are faced are imputed to those guarantee organizations. Meanwhile this paper theoretically explains that credit enterprises adopt pooling equilibrium only under certain conditions. In addition, as long as the guarantee organizations set up proper bargain contract, it enables the enterprises themselves to reveal the risk types and evade risks. Although with the introduction of guarantee organizations, bank credit rationing is alleviated. It is still very limited to resolve the problem of crediting capability of the small and medium-sized enterprises due to the existence of guarantee barriers. Finally the paper suggests that bank-guarantee organizations cooperation and socialized guarantee organization should be promoted, and that the risks should be shared to resolve the problem of financing plight of small and medium-sized ente,prises radically.

关 键 词：担保机构 均衡信贷配给 混同均衡 分离均衡 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]