一类三级供应链模型的研究  

Study about a model of three-level supply chain

作　　者：刘欠宁[1] 刘亚相[1] 单青松[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北农林科技大学生命科学学院,陕西杨凌712100

出　　处：《西北农林科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2006年第11期102-105,共4页Journal of Northwest A&F University(Natural Science Edition)

摘　　要：在博弈论的框架下,将一个二级供应链模型推广为三级供应链模型,并将之应用于研究饲料商、养猪户及消费者构成的三级供应链系统的定价决策中。建立了关于猪肉价格、需求量的消费者效用函数;建立了具有Stackelberg博弈特征的定价决策模型,并分析求解了该模型,研究了饱和状态下的饲料价格;最后讨论了政府在引导该地区饲料商、养猪户有效定价以实现最大利润及更好地满足消费者需求过程中的作用。Under the context of game theory,a model of bilevel supply chain will be extended to threelevel in this paper. And as an application,the pricing decision of a three class supply chain with a single businessman of pannage,hoggery and consumer will be dealt with. A utility function of consumers about the price of pork and the demand quantity of it are developed and discussed. Then ,the model of the pricing decision problem with Stackelberg type game is reformulated. Under the condition of saturation,the pricing of pannage is discussed. Finally,the function of the government is discussed in the process of leading the businessman of pannage and hoggery to decide the price for themselves efficiently,to maximize the interests for themselves and satisfy the consumer＇s demand better.

关 键 词：供应链 定价决策 消费者效用 STACKELBERG博弈 隐性成本 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]