西方激励性规制理论评述  

REVIEW OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY OF REGULATION

作　　者：雷华[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学经济研究中心,陕西西安710072

出　　处：《陕西科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2006年第6期146-149,共4页Journal of Shaanxi University of Science & Technology

摘　　要：在我国向市场经济转轨的过程中,传统的报酬率规制造成的低效率已经成为制约我国公用事业发展的难点。作者通过探讨西方国家所广泛采用的激励性规制理论,指出规制者和企业间的信息不对称是产生这一问题的根本原因,只有通过引入委托-代理理论,给予受规制企业以竞争的压力和提高经营效率的动力,才能克服传统的政府规制方式由于信息不对称而导致的低效率问题。In the process of changing to market economy, traditional rate-of-return regulation has been the barriers to develop our public utilities. The paper discusses the incentive regulation theory which has been wildly used in developed countries, and points out that information asymmetry in government and firms is the essential reason due to it. Principal-agent theory is the way to the government regulation, by providing firms the motives to enhance their efficient and the pressures of competence, the problem of low efficiency will be solved.

关 键 词：政府规制 信息不对称 激励性规制 委托-代理理论 

分 类 号：F224.1[经济管理—国民经济]