农业保险的经济学分析  

An Economic Analysis of Agriculture Insurance

作　　者：刘星[1] 

机构地区：[1]延安大学经济管理学院,陕西延安716000

出　　处：《延安大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第6期97-99,共3页Journal of Yan'an University (Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：政府以财政补贴、税收优惠承担部分农业保险费用的方式提供农业保险是国际通行做法,但是,随着农业保险费用支出的规模日益增大,已成为世界各国公共支出的一个沉重负担。农业保险费用的增加,除了农业风险的特殊性之外,在相当程度上是由制度性的缺陷所引起的。政府部门参与农业保险虽能避免逆向选择,但却引致道德风险。It is the international way for government to provide agriculture insurance by partly assuming the cost of agriculture insurance through means of subsidy and tax preference. But with the daily increase of expenditure of agriculture insurance,agriculture insurance has become a heavy burden of public expenditure for countries in the world. The increase of the fees of agriculture insurance ,apart from the characteristics of agriculture insurance,is to a large degree caused by the defects of the system. Therefore,this paper,from the perspective of economics, first analyzes the effects and the special nature of agriculture insurance market, then illustrates the necessity of the participation of public institutions and the impairment of moral insurance market on the efficiency of agriculture insurance market and last discusses the way of controlling the moral risk of agriculture insurance.

关 键 词：农业保险 道德风险 控制 

分 类 号：F840.6[经济管理—保险]