面向复杂标的物的投标决策模型  

Bidding decision model for complex bids

作　　者：袁林[1] 王永县[1] 朱涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2006年第12期2053-2056,共4页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70321001)

摘　　要：为了研究现代商业采购目的,开发了一种复杂标的物的投标决策模型。通过博弈论的理论和方法分析了在复杂标的物投标决策过程中,用户偏好所起的决定性作用以及用户在竞标过程中通过不断地了解竞标情况而确定自身最终的评判标准的动态过程,并对这种博弈局势进行了定量分析,给出了该局势下投标决策最优报价的解析结果。结果表明:在复杂标的物的投标决策过程中,用户偏好显著改变了竞标者之间的博弈的结果,用户偏好在一定范围内时,会有新的均衡出现,且新的均衡与用户偏好和收益密切相关。博弈过程由简单的价格竞争演化为用户和竞标者、竞标者和竞标者之间相互紧密关联的策略关系。A bidding decision model was developed for complex bids during modern business procurement activities. Based on game theory, this paper analyzes the definitive role that the user preference plays in the bidding process and analyzes the dynamic bidding process during which users determine their own ultimate evaluation criteria as they gradually learn about the bidding situation. The game scenario was analyzed quantitvely to give an analytical optimum bidding result for a given situation. The result indicates that user preferences change significantly during the game. A new equilibrium, which is closely related to user preference and benefit, occurs when the user preference is within a certain range and the game changes from a simple price competition into a correlated game relating users and bidders.

关 键 词：经济数学方法 投标决策模型 复杂标的物 用户偏好 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]