我国银行业有效监管的瓶颈与对策——以“中国银行监督管理委员会”为视角的分析  

On Countermeasures against the Bottleneck of Chinese Banking Supervisory System:from the viewpoint of the Chinese Banking Supervisory Committee

作　　者：黎四奇[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学法学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《国际经贸探索》2007年第1期57-61,共5页International Economics and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(编号04CFX008)

摘　　要：中国银监会的成立是我国金融监管机制步向专业化与法治化的一个重要举措。然而,从目前央行与银监会的实际职能来考察,这种分设的模式并没有使中国的银行业监管走向专业性、高效率性与更有效性,也没有真正解决央行原有的双重角色冲突问题,只是使原有的内部冲突外部化;同时,由于银监会的弱势,中国银行业监管的有效性正潜伏着可能失灵的危机。The establishment of Chinese Banking Supervisory Committee （CBSC） signifies a great advancement towards supervisory specialization. However,judging from the assigned functions this separation has neither led to high efficiency and effectiveness of banking supervision ,nor resulted in the solution of the conflicts of duetrole of the Central Bank. On the contrary,the original internal conflict has been externalized,and meanwhile, due to the weakness of CBSC ,the supervisory effectiveness will face a latent risk.

关 键 词：分立模式 央行 中国银监会 对策 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]