超额控制、董事会构成与公司多元化折价  

Excess Control,Board Composition and Corporate Diversification Discounts

作　　者：韩忠雪[1] 朱荣林[2] 王宁[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院 [2]国务院发展研究中心

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2007年第1期16-20,共5页Nankai Business Review

摘　　要：本文利用2004年的上市公司资料和国际通用的超额价值分析方法,不仅验证了我国上市多元化公司存在折价现象,平均折价程度达到4.8%,而且,从控股股东超额控制和董事会构成两个方面考察了控股股东攫取行为对公司多元化折价的影响。我们发现,公司多元化程度与控股股东的超额控制程度、来自控股股东的董监事比例、集团所属和两职合一呈显著正相关关系。Although diversified corporation discounts is a fact, but so far reasonal answer to this result is still lacking. Based on Chinese listed company data in 2004 and international general Excess Value means, the authors of this article not only examine these diversified companies discount for 4.8 percent, but also study controlling shareholders tunneling behavior influence corporate diversified discounts from excess control and board composition. The authors find the degree of diversification is increasing in excess control of controlling shareholders, control-affiliated directors, group affiliated and CEO duality. These results show expropriation of controlling shareholders can effectively explain corporate diversified discounts in explaining the degree of corporate diversification.

关 键 词：公司多元化折价 控服股东 超额控制 董事会构成 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F224