企业安全投资背后的利益博弈探讨  

The Analysis of the Benefit Game on the Safety Investment

作　　者：李小三[1] 崔文彩[1] 赵云胜[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国地质大学安全工程系,武汉430074

出　　处：《工业安全与环保》2007年第3期51-53,共3页Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection

摘　　要：利用职业安全卫生费用模型结合博弈论原理,对企业安全投资背后的利益冲突与协调问题进行了浅析。研究表明:企业凭借资本优势在与政府和劳动者的利益博弈中为了寻求经济利益最大化减少安全投资,使企业安全度大大降低,导致事故频发是政府、企业和劳动者之间利益博弈的结果。此外,劳动者的合法权益得不到保护,造成其在利益博弈中处于弱势地位是造成安全生产现状的重要原因之一。In this paper occupational safety and health cost model in accordance with game theory is used to conduct research on the problems of benefit conflicts and coordination based on safety investment. The research shows that the actual state of the safety investment is the results of the benefit game among the govemment, enterprise and the laborer, in which safety degree is remarkably lowered and the sccidents frequently happen because the enterprise reduces safety irrvestment in order to seek for the biggest benefits; one of the important causes leading to this kind of safety situation is that the legitimate rights and interests of the laborers can not be effectively protected, which brings about the adverse status of the laborers.

关 键 词：安全投资 博弈论 经济效益 

分 类 号：X922[环境科学与工程—安全科学]