陶瓷原材料市场绿色采购的信号传递博弈研究  

THE SIGNAL GAME RESEARCH OF ENVIRONMENTAL PURCHASING IN CERAMIC RAW MATERIALS MARKET

作　　者：欧阳小胜[1] 梁祺[1] 叶孝明[1] 

机构地区：[1]景德镇陶瓷学院,景德镇333000

出　　处：《中国陶瓷》2007年第2期28-30,共3页China Ceramics

摘　　要：陶瓷原材料市场由于信息不对称,容易造成绿色原材料供应商的逆向选择,导致陶瓷原材料绿色采购市场帕累托最优交易不能实现。从分析陶瓷原材料绿色采购逆向选择成因入手,通过建立绿色采购供需双方的信号传递博弈模型,具体分析了三种贝叶斯精炼均衡成立的条件,并且为供需双方行为提出建议,以便提高绿色采购市场交易效率。In the ceramic raw materails market, asymmetric information can result to the adverse selection phenomenon leading to the fail of first best solution. In this paper, we analyze in detail the existent condition of three perfect Bayesian equilibrium to give suggestion to the ceramic raw materials purchasing market by setting up the siganl game model of environmental purchasing.

关 键 词：绿色采购 信号博弈 逆向选择 陶瓷原材料 

分 类 号：TQ174.4[化学工程—陶瓷工业]