带限制结盟的单调集对策  

Monotonic set games with restricted coalitions

作　　者：张凤荣[1] 于华[1] 张盛开[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连轻工业学院信息科学与工程学院

出　　处：《辽宁工程技术大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第1期155-157,共3页Journal of Liaoning Technical University (Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(79870025)

摘　　要：针对传统集对策模型对局中人合作的可能性没有限制这一问题,提出了带限制结盟的单调集对策,这里的“限制”是把有限局中人集N的每一个结盟映到其子集的单调映射。采用演绎推理的分析方法,讨论了带限制结盟的单调集对策的边缘值,该值是对经典集对策边缘值的一种推广,证明了带限制结盟单调集对策边缘值的一些性质。In view of the problem that in a classical set game there are no restrictions to the cooperation possibilities of the players, the monotonic set games with restricted coalitions are proposed. A ＂restriction＂ is a monotonic projection assigned to each coalition of a finite player set N a subset of the finite player set. In this paper the method of syllogism is used to discuss the marginalistic value for monotonic set games with restricted coalitions, which is the extension of the classical one and is also proved to have some properties of the value.

关 键 词：限制 结盟 单调 集对策 边缘值 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]