股东套利行为与企业融资方式选择  

Shareholder's Arbitrage Behaviors and Firm's Choices On Financing Mode

作　　者：郑瑞玺[1] 徐新华[2] 何青[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学,天津300071 [2]南昌大学经管学院,南昌330047

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2007年第2期32-37,共6页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：股东的出资行为对企业融资方式的选择具有决定性作用。对于正常经营的企业,为了发挥债务资本的税蔽效应和杠杆作用,股东往往愿意企业负债经营,但是负债的对象不一定是普通债权人,很可能是股东自身;对于陷入财务危机的企业,为套牢普通债权人获得更多的企业重组收益,股东也愿意“自我负债”融资。通过债务性资本与替权益性资本的替换,股东总能够获得套利收益,但同时也损害了普通债权人和政府的收益,因而受到法律的限制。然而,在现实经济中股东的套利空间仍然存在,并对企业的融资方式选择,尤其是对债务资本产生了深远的影响。Shareholders＇ capital offering behaviors have decisive influence on firm＇s financing model. For those normally runed firms, shareholders are willing to take more debts to take the advantages of leverage and tax shield effect from debt financing, while the shareholders may not borrow from the ordinary debtees but from themselves. And for the firms suffered from financial distress, shareholders still prefer ＂self-lending＂ to other debts, thus tacking ordinary debtees and making them accept reorganization arrangement. Shareholders can always seize private interest by substituting debet -- offering for equity--offering, but such substitution harms ordinary debtees and government＇ s interest and was banned by law. However, in the reality there are still lots of such arbitrage opportunities, which exert far-reaching impacts on firms financing models, especially on debts.

关 键 词：套利机会 股东行为 融资方式 重组与清算 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]