差异Bertrand寡占厂商的技术许可策略  

LICENSING STRATEGY OF INNOVATING FIRM IN A DIFFERENTIATED BERTRAND OLIGOPOLY

作　　者：郭红珍[1] 李莹[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学工商管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《经济数学》2006年第4期386-393,共8页Journal of Quantitative Economics

摘　　要：利用消费者效用函数推导出产品市场差异Bertrand价格竞争均衡的一般式;结合技术许可的收入效应与租金耗散效应,分析了差异Bertrand多家对称创新厂商与差异Bertrand双寡头中的唯一创新厂商对竞争对手的固定费用许可策略.结果表明:(1)多家对称创新厂商与唯一创新厂商均选择不向潜在进入者发放许可;(2)只要产品差异程度符合一定条件,差异Bertrand双寡头中的唯一创新厂商将向技术劣势在位竞手许可其各种规模的工艺创新.A model is developed to obtain differentiated Bertrand price competition equilibrium in the product market from the maximization of a quadratic utility fimction; Combining the revenue effect and rent dissipation effect of licensing, how competition among several technology owners affects their incentives to license technology to potential entrants by s fixed-fee is studied. The technology licensing strategy of a monopolist patentee in a duopoly is examined too. It is showed that the innovators in these two cases will not license their technology to potential entrants, but the monopolist patentee in the duopoly will sell license to the incumbent rival as long as the goods are imperfect substitutes.

关 键 词：BERTRAND竞争 许可策略 创新厂商 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学] F224