政府信誉与自然垄断产业的规制绩效  

Government Reputation and the Efficiency of Regulation for Natural Monopoly Industry

作　　者：初可佳[1] 吴仁军[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《郑州航空工业管理学院学报》2007年第2期95-99,共5页Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics

摘　　要：政府信誉度高是政府对自然垄断产业的微观规制取得较好效果的必要条件,如果政府信誉度低,就会出现规制的失效。体制转轨中的中国,政府信誉低,这在政府规制中表现为:规制的法制环境存在根本性缺陷、政府规制背后的实质是行政垄断、规制部门身份与职能的重叠,等等。这一特性造成政府对自然垄断产业的规制绩效的低下,其相关的规制政策实际上造成市场扭曲和社会福利的损失。我们必须加强政府的法律制约并改善政府质量,才能提高政府信誉和规制绩效。To get a high efficiency of regulation for natural monopoly industry, the government must have good reputation, unless, regulation will be failure. In China, an system - transforming country, the reputation of government is low, for example ,there are some basic limitation in the legal system, and regulation sometimes becomes administration monopoly, and so on. With the low reputation of government, regulation for natural monpoly industry will distort the market and make society welfare loss. So we should use regal system to restrict the government and improve government quality, by which we can improve government reputation and the ifficiency of regulation for natural monopoly industry.

关 键 词：信誉 自然垄断 微观规制 

分 类 号：F20[经济管理—国民经济]