不同竞合模式的战略联盟形式选择  

On choice of strategic alliance forms under different co-competition modes

作　　者：郭焱[1] 郭彬[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院 [2]太原理工大学经济管理学院,太原030024

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2007年第1期39-45,共7页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：天津大学青年教师基金项目(5110112);中国博士后基金资助项目(20060400711)

摘　　要：利用多阶段动态博弈方法来探讨不同竞合模式的联盟形式选择问题,得出如下结论:从产业产量最大化角度,政府部门愿意让企业选择只在R&D阶段合作的R&D联盟形式;从R&D费用水平最小化角度,企业会选择不联盟;从企业联合利润最大化角度,如果全联盟的利润大于半联盟的利润,企业选择R&D联盟和产销联盟形式;反之,企业选择R&D联盟形式;从企业利润最大化和R&D费用水平最小化角度,企业会在R&D阶段选择R&D联盟形式后,在生产销售阶段选择领先战略.The problem of choice of strategic alhance forms under different co-competition modes is explored using an approach of more-stage game in this paper. We show that only cooperation in the R＆D stage is enterprise＇ s choice from the view of maximum output of industry. According to minimization of R＆D expenditure, noncooperation at both R＆D stage and product ＆ marketing stage is reasonable choice for enterprises. From the aspect of maximum industry profits, if the profit of cooperation at both stages is more than that of only cooperation at the R＆D stage, the forms of cooperation in both stages will be feasible for enterprises, whereas, the only cooperation form at the R＆D stage is feasible for enterprises. In terms of maximum enterprises＇ profits and minimum R＆D expenditure, after selecting cooperation at the R＆D stage, the enterprises may select leading cooperation strategy with other firms at the product ＆ marketing stage.

关 键 词：战略联盟 形式选择 竞合模式 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F113.2[经济管理—国际贸易]