基于技术融合的企业研发勾结研究  

Study on R&D Cartelization of Enterprises Based on the Technological Convergence

作　　者：陈抗[1] 郁明华[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2007年第1期142-148,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70440010)

摘　　要：随着技术融合的日益盛行,产业融合的趋势越来越显著,企业跨产业的合作屡见不鲜。这种技术融合推动下的新竞合动态,迫使企业重新思考创新战略:即,企业如何突破原有产业边界,通过跨技术领域的合作创新,来降低成本、增加产量、提高企业利润、增进社会福利。因此,本文针对目前企业采用最频繁的合作创新模式———研发勾结(R&D Cartelization),在D'Aspremont二阶段模型的基础上,通过构建相应的博弈模型,研究了不同的产品替代系数、技术溢出系数以及创新系数对合作企业均衡成本、均衡研发投资、均衡产量和均衡利润的影响,并进行了相关案例分析。With the phenomenon of technological convergence and industrial convergence getting universal unprecedentedly, co-operations between enterprises from different industries are occurring frequently. The new trend of co-opetition in technological convergence compels enterprises to think over their strategies in product innovation： how to break through the fetters from industrial boundary, and work together with firms from different industrial departments and technological areas, to decrease the cost, increase the output, improve the profit, and promote the social welfare. Thus, in view of most popular cooperative R＆D model： R＆D cartelization, and based on the two stage game model of D＇Aspremont, we set up a R＆D Cartelization Model of enterprises during the industrial convergence in this paper, and discuss how substitution coefficient between convergent product and original products, spillover coefficient of R＆D, and innovation coefficient of R＆D influence equilibrium in cost, equilibrium in investment of R＆D, equilibrium in output of convergent product and original products, equilibrium in firms＇ profit. And we also give a case study.

关 键 词：技术融合 企业 研发勾结 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学] F270