保险人与保险中介人之间的信息不对称问题研究  

An Analysis on the Asymmetric Information between Insurers and Insurance Intermediaries

作　　者：刘军生 周晓敏[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京康信保险经纪有限公司,北京100025 [2]对外经济贸易大学保险系,北京100029

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2007年第2期79-84,共6页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

摘　　要：保险人与保险中介人之间由于期望效用不一致、信息资源不充分等原因导致了信息不对称,对保险人造成负面影响的是代理人隐瞒行为型信息不对称。要解决保险人与保险中介人之间的信息不对称,一方面应加强保险人与保险中介人自身的内部约束,另一方面应建立利益趋同机制和保险信用评级制度。The introduction of insurance intermediaries into the insurance market can optimize resources allocation and improve the market efficiency, but its role is limited because of asymmetric information. This article mainly discusses the asymmetric information between insurers and insurance intermediaries, analyzes its cause and effect, and provides the method from the economical analysis of Principal-Agent Model. Finally, this paper makes the de＇tailed suggestions to solve the asymmetric information between insurers and insurance intermediaries from the internal and external aspect, which is important to promote the healthy development of the insurance market.

关 键 词：保险中介人 保险代理 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]