补偿契约模式下的供应链产能投资研究  

Capacity Investments in Supply Chain with Rebate Contracts

作　　者：徐最[1] 朱道立[1] 朱文贵[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《科技导报》2007年第7期71-76,共6页Science & Technology Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70432001)

摘　　要：研究由一个制造商和一个供应商构成的供应链,后者是为前者提供定制化产品的唯一厂商。产品的需求是随机的,供应商在观察到需求前进行产能投资,制造商在观察到需求后开始下订单,随后,供应商根据订单进行生产。由于供应商独自承担产能过剩带来的损失,因此往往建造低于实现系统利润最大化的产能水平。提出了两种补偿契约,促使供应商建造更多的产能,前者使得供应商能够建造比批发价格契约下更高的产能水平,而后者使渠道协调。最后对批发价格契约、线性补偿契约和非线性补偿契约3种契约的利润进行了比较。In this paper, a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer, with the latter being the only source for a customized product is considereel. Demand is stochastic, the supplier has to invest in capacity before seeing the demand, and the manufacturer makes his final order after seeing the demand. To allow for the loss of overeapacity, the supplier will build less capacity than what is the optimal for the supply chain. In this paper, two kinds of rebate contracts are put forward, the former can induce the supplier to invest in more capacity than under the wholesale price contract, the latter coordinates the supply chain. Finally the three kinds of contracts are compared.

关 键 词：供应链 协调 产能 补偿契约 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济] F224