虚假会计信息博弈解析  

False Accounting Information:a Game Analysis

作　　者：叶陈毅[1] 郭强华[2] 连珂[3] 

机构地区：[1]石家庄经济学院会计学院,河北石家庄050031 [2]宁波大学商学院,浙江宁波315211 [3]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2007年第2期120-122,共3页Contemporary Economic Management

摘　　要：本文借助博弈理论,推导出会计信息质量的混合纳什均衡模型。并且放宽假设,对会计信息质量博弈模型进行了拓展,分析了上市公司和注册会计师之间在会计信息质量上的博弈关系,最后提出了治理会计信息失真的路径。Based on the game theory, this paper deduces the mix Nash Balanced Model on accounting information quality. And through the flexible supposition, the game model of the accounting information quality has been developed to analyze the game relationships between the listed company and chartered accountant, and the path is presented for governing distortion of the accounting information.

关 键 词：上市公司 CPA 博弈 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]