基于信号博弈的经营者管理成本分析  

Study on the entrepreneur's Management Cost based on the Signal Game

作　　者：陆为民[1] 刘子先[1] 门峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2007年第3期22-25,共4页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071042);天津市社科基金项目(TJ05-GL008)

摘　　要：经营者管理成本是企业人力资源成本管理的重要内容,在信息不对称的经营者市场环境下,提高经营者管理成本确定的效率和准确性既能提高企业人力资源成本计量的准确性,又能为企业制定正确的经营者管理决策提供可靠依据。宜将企业经营者管理成本确定的过程理解为不完全信息动态博弈——信号博弈,可通过建立博弈模型,对企业经营者管理成本的确定进行博弈分析,来研究影响经营者管理成本的因素和条件,为提高企业经营者管理成本确定的效率和准确性提供有益的指导。The measurement of entrepreneur＇ s management cost is the important part of the cost management of human resource in the enterprise. Because of information imperfection between the enterprise and the entrepreneur,imporving the efficiency and the accuracy of the measurement of entrepreneur＇ ss management cost can provide the credible basis of enterprise＇s decision. This paper first aalyzes the measurement of entrepreneur＇s management cost , which will provide the guidance to improve the efficiency and the accuracy of the measurement of ectrepreneur＇ s management cost.

关 键 词：经营者管理成本 信号博弈 分离均衡 合并均衡 混同均衡 

分 类 号：F423[经济管理—产业经济]