论理解主体的“前见”合法性——科学解释学的视角  

On the Legality of the “Foresight” of Understanding Subject——From the Point of the Scientific Hermeneutics

作　　者：吴琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学政治与行政学院,湖北武汉430063

出　　处：《贵州师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第2期24-29,共6页Journal of Guizhou Normal University(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：在传统认识论看来,理解主体所拥有的“前见”是一种主观性产物,是认识真理的障碍,因此,必须加以铲除。然而,解释学理论却赋予“前见”以一种合法性,认为“前见”是理解得以可能的前提条件,从而与传统认识论区别开来。本文将系统分析“前见”合法性的解释学内涵,并结合以波普尔为代表的批判理性主义和后经验主义,如库恩的科学范式理论、拉卡托斯的科学研究纲领、劳丹的研究传统等思想,进一步确证“前见”的合理内涵。The traditional epistemology endeavored to get rid of the foresight of understanding subject, which was seen as a barrier of seeking truth. However, the Hermeneuties gave the foresight validity, which was the premise of the understanding. This paper will analyze the hermeneutie connotations of the for-sight, which will also be confirmed by other points from theories of Popper＇s critique rationalism and post-empiricism, such as Kuhn＇s paradigm, Lakatos＇s scientific research program and Laudan＇s research traditions, and finally, we will get the conclusions that the natural science no doubt has the characteristics of the hermeneutics.

关 键 词：理解主体 前见 合法性 

分 类 号：B017[哲学宗教—哲学理论]