递增奖品R&D竞赛的模型设计与均衡分析  

Model Design and Equilibrium Analysis of Increasing-prize R&D Contests

作　　者：乔恒[1] 邱菀华[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2007年第4期77-80,共4页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项基金(200159);航空科学预研基金(03J51057);国家自然科学基金(7037201170401004)

摘　　要：在R&D竞赛中竞赛者付出努力不仅可以扩大赢得概率,而且可以得到更多竞赛奖励.依据这一现象本文设计构建了一类递增奖品R&D竞赛模型.通过对纳什均衡存在的一阶必要条件和二阶充分条件的分析,给出了对称和非对称模型纳什均衡的表达形式,探讨了竞赛的回报率和竞赛者实力差别对竞赛结果的影响.The improvement of contestants＇ effort in a R＆D contest not only increases the winning probability, but also increases the value of the prize. Based on this phenomenon, a kind of increasing-prize R＆D contest model is established. The first-order necessary conditions and the second-order sufficient conditions of the existence of Nash equilibrium are analyzed. The Nash equilibria of the symmetric and asymmetric contest models are characterized. The influence of the reward parameter and the difference of the contestants＇ competence on the results of the contests are discussed.

关 键 词：竞赛 纳什均衡 全支付拍卖 

分 类 号：F2[经济管理—国民经济]