人力资本投资失衡的进化博弈分析  

EVOLUTION GAME ANALYSIS OF THE UNBALANCE IN HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT

作　　者：谢文昕[1] 周亚[1] 李克强[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学系统科学系,北京100875

出　　处：《北京师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第2期209-212,共4页Journal of Beijing Normal University(Natural Science)

基　　金：2004年教育部重大课题资助项目(04JZD0023);北京市教育科学"十一五"规划重点课题资助项目(AAB06178)

摘　　要：指出我国目前存在人力资本投资失衡问题,并运用进化博弈的分析方法,构建了对称状态下的模仿者动态方程;认为个体采用高学历和低学历两种策略,得出了复制动态下的3个均衡解.结论表明我国劳动者以较高的概率选择高学历,而高技术岗位的增长无法与高学历的增长相匹配,从而导致了人才浪费.The human capital investment in China is unbalance. The imitator dynamic equation is built under the symmetry state referring to the theoretical method of the evolution game theory. The individual adopts two educational background strategies, high or low. It leads to three balanced solution under a replication dynamic state. The conclusion shows that Chinese labors get a high rate choosing the high educational background, but the growth of number of the high tech position cannot match with the high educational background, thus causing talented labor waste.

关 键 词：人力资本 进化博弈 复制动态 

分 类 号：F240[经济管理—劳动经济]