非对称信息下的协调供应链研究  

Coordinated Supply-Chain under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：于晓辉[1] 张强[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学,北京100081

出　　处：《物流科技》2007年第5期80-83,共4页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70471063);985工程二期资助项目(107008200400024);北京市重点学科资助项目(xk100070534)

摘　　要：针对m个供应商与n个零售商构成的分布型供应链,其中供应商作为主导者确定批发价,零售商确定各自的零售价,市场需求量由零售商的价格弹性需求决定的问题,利用逆向归纳法的方法研究具有Stackelberg博弈特征的定价决策,同时给出由信息非对称分散控制供应链转化为信息对称集中控制供应链的协调条件。研究表明,在信息非对称条件下,当零售商利润占总利润比例在一定区域范围内时,零售商可以和供应商信息共享,从而达到供应链系统协调下的“双赢”。最后通过实例验证给出了结论。In the context of m-supplier and n-retailer distributed supply-chain, the suppliers who are leaders decide the trading price, and the retailers who are followers decide the retail price. The marketing demand is determined by the retailers＇ price flexible demand. In the thesis, the pricing decision in the correlation with Stackelberg game has been made by means of converse induction. In the same time, the coordinating condition in which the distributed supply-chain under symmetric information can be transformed into the centralized supply-chain under asymmetric information has been gained. The studying proves that the retailers and the suppliers can share their information and the supply-chain can gain ＂Win-Win＂ in condition that the retailers＂ profit proportion is in a certain range. In the end of the thesis an example is given in prove of the conclusion.

关 键 词：供应链契约 博弈论 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]