中日雇佣制度的比较——隐性契约理论的视角  

Comparison of Employment System between China and Japan——In view of implicit contracts theory

作　　者：姚先国[1] 王光新[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学公共管理学院 [2]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310027

出　　处：《江南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2007年第2期54-58,共5页Journal of Jiangnan University：Humanities & Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：文章运用隐性契约理论分析了日本的终身雇佣制和中国的固定工制度。日本的企业对于自己的资产具有剩余控制权,注重建立并维护自己的声誉,企业和员工达成一种长期雇佣的默契,他们之间是一种重复博弈,是一个标准的隐性契约。中国过去的国营企业没有自己的资产和剩余控制权,更没有自己的声誉,国家间接地替员工和自己签订了一份终身雇佣的合同,企业和员工之间是一个一次性博弈,当员工的权利受到伤害时无法用退出权来保护自己,这种雇佣制度是一个更多的附有显性契约性质的隐性契约。二者的执行及激励约束机制完全不同,从而导致了完全不同的经济增长效果。This paper analyzes the contractual properties of Japanese life-employment and Chinese fixed-employment system in view of implicit contracts theory. Japanese enterprises have their own assets and the surplus controlling power, and they attach importance to form their reputation and cherish it. Employer and employee reach a tacit agreement of life-long employment and the game between them is a repeated one which forms a standard implicit contract. In contrast Chinese state-owned enterprises had no assets, no surplus controlling power, nor reputation of their own. The country signed a permanent employment contract for employee and himself indirectly, so the game was a one time game and the contract was an implicit one with more properties of explicit contract. Their implementing encouraging and constraining mechanism of the two employment system has many differences which explains their completely different economic growth effect.

关 键 词：终身雇佣制 固定工制度 隐性契约 博弈 激励 约束 

分 类 号：F241.3[经济管理—劳动经济]