基于煤矿安全生产监督研究的博弈分析  

Game Analysis Based on Coal Mine Work Safety Supervision

作　　者：禹金云[1] 罗一新[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学土木工程学院 [2]湖南财政经济学院(筹)工商管理系

出　　处：《中国安全科学学报》2007年第3期67-70,共4页China Safety Science Journal

摘　　要：对安全生产监督脆弱是造成我国企业安全生产状况十分严峻的重要原因,必须采取相应的措施予以解决。笔者从博弈的视角出发,应用博弈论的相关理论分析现有体制和制度框架下我国企业安全生产的监督效果,提出了一些解决的措施。笔者认为,要改善我国企业安全生产状况的根本出路在于制度创新和激励监督者的“努力”行为。必须实施制度创新,充分提高企业职工自觉进行安全监督的积极性;加重对“违规”行为的处罚力度,只能在短期内减少其“违规”的概率,而不会消除或降低“违规”行为的发生。正确的做法应该是从长远看,加强对监督者“努力”行为的激励力度,才能消除或降低“违规”行为的发生。Weak supervision of work safety is an important cause to the severe situation of Chinese coal mine safety, it must be solved by taking some countermeasures. Based on the effect analysis of work safety supervision under current supervision system on enterprises＂ safety by applying game theory, corresponding measures are raised. The fundamental way to improve work safety of enterprise lies in the innovation of system and stimulation of supervisors. Innovation of system is very helpful to improve employees＇activeness to conduct consciously safety supervision; severe punishment for ＂violation of regulations＂ only reduces its probability in a short of time, but can not eliminate such behavior. Therefore, stimulating supervisors to endeavor for work safety is the proper way to eliminate or decline the behavior of ＂violation＂ from the longtime perspective.

关 键 词：安全 监督 博弈 煤矿 企业 

分 类 号：X936[环境科学与工程—安全科学]