地方保护主义探源——一个政治晋升博弈模型  

An Analysis of Local Protectionism——A Game Model of Political Promotion

作　　者：何智美[1] 王敬云[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]南京政治学院上海分院,上海200433

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2007年第5期1-6,共6页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：中国政府组织的治理结构是对上负责制,在对地方官员的晋升选拔中,中央政府依靠的是考察相对经济绩效而不是绝对经济绩效的锦标赛式选拔机制。在政治晋升博弈中,地方官员会尽量内化自己正的外部效应,而放任负的外部效应的发生,将对竞争对手有利的外部效应当作对自己不利的事情来加以规避。因此,政治锦标赛机制有利于地方政府间的竞争而不利于合作,会带来道德风险、逆向选择问题。要解决这些问题,应该就考核指标和选拔机制进行改革,使官员的对上负责制变为对下负责制,同时要转变政府职能。Governing Structure of Chinese government organization is responsible. During promotion and selection of local officials, central government depends on the selective mechanism of rank- order tournament which decides on their relative economic achievement but not on their absolute ones. In the game of political promotion, local officials try their best to internalize their own positive external effects, while leave their negative externals alone. Political rank - order tournament mechanism is helpful to competition but unhelpful to cooperation. To solve the problem, we should reform the evaluative index and selective mechanism so as to change the system of being responsible for that of being responsible for the subordinates, while changing governmental function.

关 键 词：地方保护主义 政治晋升博弈 政府职能 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学]