对Cartel联盟机制的博弈分析及其改进  

A Game Analysis and Its Improvement on Cartel Alliance Mechanism

作　　者：金明[1] 

机构地区：[1]成都信息工程学院统计系,四川成都610103

出　　处：《统计与信息论坛》2007年第3期26-28,共3页Journal of Statistics and Information

摘　　要：Cartel联盟是当前企业合作的重要形式,它以限价和限量为手段追求整个行业最大收益,然后根据公平分配机制分享利润。而利用纳氏混合策略均衡解的思想,研究n个企业的Cartel联盟合作机制的博弈情况。纳氏均衡解表明此合作模式因个别企业的背叛而导致该合作模式可靠性不强,引入惩罚机制后,得出保证Cartel联盟合作为博弈均衡解的条件,以求出了惩罚系数的取值范围。Using the theory of Nash equilibrium point, the paper has studied n enterprises＇ game analysis of Cartel Alliance Mechanism and generalized the conclusion of other papers, which shows the cooperative model exists weak reliability for betrayal of one enterprise. The paper has introduced the punishment Mechanism and got the condition that promises Cartel cooperation as Nash equilibrium point. The bound of Punishment Coefficient is solved.

关 键 词：博弈均衡 cartel联盟 古诺模型 惩罚函数 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]