美日问题信用社市场退出机制的比较及启示  

The Comparison of Withdrawal Mechanism for Failure Credit Unions between US and Japan and the Enlightenment

作　　者：张旭[1] 卢百魁[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛大学经济学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《福建金融管理干部学院学报》2007年第2期14-18,共5页Journal of Fujian Institute of Financial Administrators

基　　金：山东省社科规划研究项目(项目编号:05JDK32)"金融结构变迁中的区域金融安全网"阶段性成果。

摘　　要：对问题信用社的监管是一国金融制度的一个重要环节。文章以美国和日本为例,比较两国问题信用社处理的法律框架、主管机构、处理手段和援助资金来源,在此基础上分析我国处理问题信用社方式上的不足,并建议以市场主导型取代政府主导型的退出机制。Supervision against failure credit unions plays a very important role in constructing the finance system. This article compares the law frame, superintended institution, managing means and source of aiding capital of the failure credit unions both in US and Japan, and analyzes the flaws of the methods of coping with failure credit unions in China. Then it gets the conclusion that the market-oriented mechanism should replace the withdrawal mechanism of the government-oriented one.

关 键 词：信用社 退出机制 重组 并购 金融监管 

分 类 号：F830.2[经济管理—金融学]