水权交易机制及博弈模型研究  

Design of Mechanism and Bayesian Model of Water Rights Market

作　　者：李长杰[1] 王先甲[1] 范文涛[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学系统工程研究所,武汉430072 [2]中国科学院物理与数学研究所,武汉430071

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2007年第5期90-94,100,共6页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家科技攻关计划(2002BA901A37);南昌大学中国中部经济发展研究中心资助

摘　　要：针对水权交易市场最常见的买卖双方具有多人的双边交易形式,引入双边拍卖交易模式.首先给出水权拍卖交易过程,建立了不完全信息下的水权交易双方叫价拍卖的贝叶斯博弈模型;设计了水权交易双方叫价拍卖的机制,给出拍卖规则和市场出清规则,给出的机制满足有效性和激励相容性.It is being a new direction of water management in the world to establish tradable water rights mechanism to improve the efficient of the use and allocation of water recourses, which can achieve the optimization allocation of water recourses. So water market and water rights have been widely discussed in recent years, in which the transactions modes and models of water rights are the core in water market study of theory and practice. Based on the market norm of double auction, this paper describes the auction process of double auction in water rights market, and establishes the Bayesian model in incomplete information of water rights double tradeoffs. A mechanism design of water rights double auction is given, including auction rule and market clearing rule, and the effectivity and incentive compatibility is proved. Lastly a model implementation is given.

关 键 词：水权交易 双边拍卖 贝叶斯博弈模型 机制设计 激励相容 

分 类 号：F724.59[经济管理—产业经济] N94[自然科学总论—系统科学]