行动、因果关系和自我——塞尔行动哲学述评  

Action, Causation and Self: Some Remarks on Searle’s Philosophy of Action

作　　者：盛晓明[1] 吴彩强[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学语言与认知研究中心,浙江杭州310028

出　　处：《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2007年第3期143-150,共8页Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学创新基地"语言与认知研究"资助项目(205000-811342)

摘　　要：塞尔的行动哲学实际上论证了一个康德式的问题自由行动如何可能?他将意向性和行动紧密联系起来,指出意向性引起行动,行动使意向性得到满足。这种关系是通过心理因果关系实现的。心理因果关系不同于一般的因果关系,它不是行动的充分条件。正因为如此,在行动中我们需要设定一个不可还原的非休谟式自我。塞尔的这种考察行动的方式避免了内省主义和行为主义的缺陷,推进了行动哲学的讨论。但其分析还显粗糙,有待我们的精细化。In his discussion on action, Searle combines intentionality with action closely, pointing out that intentionality causes action and action satisfies intentionality. To analyze the structure of action, he differentiates prior intention from action （including intention-in-action and bodily movement）. Prior intention refers to action and the whole action is its intentional object. But intention-in-action only refers to bodily movement. Despite this difference, prior intention and intention-in-action are causally self referential. The claim that intentions are causally self-referential means that it is part of the content of a prior intention that it causes the corresponding action by producing a representation of its own conditions of satisfaction. Similarly, it is part of the content of an intention-in-action that it causes a body movement by producing a presentation of its own conditions of satisfaction. With these, prior intention causes intention-in-action which in turn causes body movement. Conversely, body movement satisfies intention-in-action which in turn satisfies prior intention. It is mental causation that shapes the relationship between intentionality and action. It is noted that the logical form of the explanation of human behavior in terms of mental causation is causation. That is to say that mental causation isn essential feature of mental causation is that the radically different from the standard forms of t sufficient and cannot determine action. An mental state itself functions causally in the production of its own conditions of satisfaction or its conditions of satisfaction function causally in its production. Because of these, we should postulate an irreducible Non-human Self. Besides body and experience which Hume attributed to the self, the Non-human Self contains a conscious agent. Searle＇s philosophy of action, in our analysis, demonstrates a Kantian question, how is voluntary action possible？ It includes three sub-class questions. What is the relationship between intentionality an

关 键 词：行动 意向性 因果关系 自我 

分 类 号：B08[哲学宗教—哲学理论]