中国农民经济纠纷解决偏好分析  

Preference of the Dispute Resolution in the Chinese Countryside

作　　者：沈明明[1] 王裕华 

机构地区：[1]北京大学政府管理学院,北京100871 [2]密西根大学政治学系

出　　处：《北京大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2007年第3期120-130,共11页Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：中宣部宣教局;教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(02JAZJD810001);北京大学中国国情研究中心;福特基金会的共同资助

摘　　要：根据发展理论,经济发达地区的人们对正式法律制度应有更强的偏好。利用北京大学中国国情研究中心的全国调查数据,本文考察农村居民在面对经济纠纷时的策略选择验证这一假设。描述性分析显示,诉讼成本、法律知识以及传统因素是阻碍人们使用正式法律渠道解决纠纷的主要障碍。统计分析揭示:1·经济发展速度,而非经济发展水平,对正式法律制度具有支持作用;2·经济发展水平超过一定程度后,其边际效用为负;3·一般来说,卷入市场经济程度越深的人,对正式法律制度的偏好越强;但这种关系在控制住法律信息水平的情况下消失。Development theory hypothesizes that the higher level of economic development a region is, the more likely the individuals prefer the formal legal institutions in resolving their disputes. Drawn from a national survey conducted by the Research Center of Contemporary China at Peking University, this paper sets forth to test this hypothesis in the context of China＇s countryside. The analysis shows first that cost concern, legal knowledge, and traditions are main obstacles for people using the formal legal institutions. Examining the rural people＇s institutional preferences when they have economic disputes, statistical analysis reveals： 1 ） economic growth rate, rather than level of economic development, is conducive to the consolidation of formal legal institutions; 2） the marginal effect of economic development turns negative after crossing a certain threshold ; 3） one who gets more involved in market activities, is more likely to use court to solve his disputes ; however, this relationship disappears after controlling for amount of legal information he has.

关 键 词：发展理论 正式法律制度 纠纷解决 制度偏好 

分 类 号：F121[经济管理—世界经济]