车险理赔业务中的徇私赔付及其对策  

Indemnifying with Favoritism and Its Countermeasures in Automobile Insurance Businesses

作　　者：李天凤[1] 周支立[1] 陈凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2007年第3期341-345,共5页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371037)

摘　　要：针对理赔人员徇私赔付问题,借用博弈论中的委托-代理理论构建了一个“三方三阶段不完美动态博弈模型”,通过对被保险人、理赔人员、保险公司三方的博弈分析,得出了当理赔人员秉公理赔时,其薪酬激励系数、罚金与赔款支出、保险公司二次审核之间的博弈数理关系,并据此指导某公司制定出一系列对理赔人员监督和激励的管控措施。经过近一年实践,取得了较好的效果。Aiming insurance personnel＇s indemnifying with favoritism, an incomplete dynamic game model was built by using client-agent in game theory. The games among insurant, insurance personnel and an insurance company were analyzed. The motivating factor of salary, fine and indemnity were found to make the insurance personnel indemnify with justice. The internal controlling mechanism, including supervising and motivating mechanism, and an assessing method of salary for the all employees were established by an insurance company. The company has made great achievement after these measurements were carried out for almost a year.

关 键 词：机动车辆保险 博弈 理赔管理与控制 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]