基于股票期权的商业银行经理人激励约束机制研究  

A Study on Executive Incentive and Constrain Mechanism of Commercial Bank Based on Stock Option in China

作　　者：彭小兵[1] 马泉[2] 蒲勇健[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学贸易与行政学院,重庆400030 [2]国家开发银行重庆分行,重庆400010 [3]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2007年第2期42-46,58,共6页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(02JA790062);教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20020611009)

摘　　要：我国股份制商业银行还没有一种严格意义上的股票期权制度,也没有解决如何制定基于股票期权的最优激励约束合同的理论问题。文章对传统薪酬制度的激励机制和股票期权制度的激励机制进行了对比研究,然后利用博弈论的基本原理构造导入股票期权的商业银行经理人激励约束机制。研究表明,基于股票期权的薪酬制度优于传统固定薪酬制度和经营者年薪制;引入股票期权制度后在激励约束机制的相互制衡作用、以及银行股东和经理人在个人效用最大化条件下,可以达成最优合同。There is not a stock option system rigorously in our commercial bank, and there don＇t answer the question which how to make the optimum incentive contract based on stock option system either. The paper firstly compared the incentive mechanism of conventional wage systems with the incentive mechanism based on stock option, and then constructed executive stock option incentive and constrain mechanism in commercial bank based on game theory. It is concluded that the wage system based on stock option is superior to conventional fixed wage institution and executive yearly salary system, and a optimum contract would be made between the principal as stockholders and agent as executive when commercial banks designs a stock option incentive and constrain mechanism.

关 键 词：股份制商业银行 人力资源管理 博弈论 股票期权制度 激励约束机制 经理人 

分 类 号：F830.33[经济管理—金融学]