利用博弈模型分析和评价日本渔业管理  

An Analysis of Japanese Fishery Management Based on a Game Model

作　　者：杨立敏[1] 刘群[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学,山东青岛266003

出　　处：《中国海洋大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第3期372-376,共5页Periodical of Ocean University of China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(30271025)资助

摘　　要：分析日本渔业协同组合的建立对日本渔业管理活动的改进,针对这种政府、渔业协同组合和渔民的行为选择结果能够达到相对均衡状态,并且能够有效弥补政府单一监管模式的不足的管理模式,本文从博弈论角度分析渔民、政府、渔业协同组合的行为选择依据,得出了渔业协会是政府有效监管的必要前提,进而对我国渔业管理提供很好的借鉴意义。It has been proved that the Japanese fishery association has greatly improved the efficiency of Japanese fishery management. Because it can offset the deficiency of the government-only supervision model, and under the model, the government, the association and fishermen can reach equilibrium. To study the function of the Japanese fishery association further, we set up a three-player game model to analyze the behavior choice of each player-fishermen, government, fishery association. Based on the analysis, we reach the conclusion that the fishery association is essential for effective government supervision, which is of value to our fishery management.

关 键 词：博弈论 日本 渔业管理 

分 类 号：S911[农业科学—水产科学]