从美国基金投资业绩看机构投资者的代理问题及其市场影响  

Agency Problem in Institutional Investors and its Effect on Market:Based on Performance of US Fund Managers

作　　者：蔡庆丰[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学金融系

出　　处：《国际金融研究》2007年第6期9-17,共9页Studies of International Finance

基　　金：2005年教育部人文社科基地重大项目"金融制度设计和经济增长"(项目代码X11002)的资助。

摘　　要：与个人投资者相比,机构投资者具备信息优势和规模经济,但即使在基金业最发达的美国,多数机构投资者还是无法战胜市场。本文认为机构投资者的代理问题是导致其无法充分发挥信息处理优势的主要原因之一,并且这种代理投资的道德风险也会给金融市场带来消极的影响。Compared with individual investors, the assumption of ＂rational investor＂ is more applicable to institutional investors which can exploit the scale economies and are better positioned in information collection. But most of institutional investors underperformed the market even in USA where the fund industry is the most developed. The agency problem is one of the most important reasons and badly hurts principals directly as well as exerts negative influence on the information efficiency and functional efficiency of the market.

关 键 词：机构投资者 代理问题 金融市场 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]