激励过程中的正式契约与关系契约:一个综述  

Formal Contract and Relational Contract during the Incentive Process

作　　者：李治国[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2007年第3期62-67,共6页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目（06JC790011）;上海市社科规划一般课题（2006BJID01）的研究资助.

摘　　要：本文研究解决激励问题的两种契约方法。正式契约基于多任务委托代理模型,探讨如何解决代理人重视考核绩效与委托人关注产出价值之间的矛盾,而关系契约基于重复博弈模型,探讨客观测度与主观判断以及短期收益与长期收益之间的矛盾。正式契约与关系契约的结合可以降低代理人所面对的激励扭曲,能够控制委托人违背承诺的诱因。在解决激励问题中应对正式契约和关系契约的合理运用进行综合权衡。Two contractual methods are analyzed to solve incentive problems. Formal contract is based on muhi-task model, and emphasizes on the conflictions between performance measure and output contribution. Relational contract is based on repeated game, and focuses on the contradiction between objective measure and subjective judgment. The combination of these two contractual methods will reduce both distortional incentive and reneging temptation during the incentive process.

关 键 词：激励 正式契约 关系契约 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]